In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: International Conflict over Discovery of Evidence in Foreign Countries by Laing, David Jamison
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 12 | Number 1 Article 6
Winter 1987
In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale:
International Conflict over Discovery of Evidence
in Foreign Countries
David Jamison Laing
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David J. Laing, In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: International Conflict over Discovery of Evidence in Foreign Countries, 12
N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 137 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol12/iss1/6
In re Sociit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale:
International Conflict over Discovery of Evidence
in Foreign Countries
The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure' grant litigants broad powers to investigate an adverse party.
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.'' 2 The
parties conduct the investigation themselves, seeking judicial inter-
vention only if a dispute arises. Such unrestricted party discovery, a
cornerstone of U.S. civil litigation, is alien to other legal systems.3
Most nations allow comparatively limited discovery. England, for ex-
ample, does not permit depositions from non-parties, and interroga-
tories are available only by court order.4 Especially in civil law
jurisdictions, discovery is mostly a judicial function. 5 A court official
determines what evidence is necessary for litigation, orders docu-
ment production, and questions witnesses. 6 In France, if a non-
party's testimony is necessary, the court appoints a judge to interro-
gate the witness and submit a report to the litigants and the court.7
A French judge may even personally visit premises involved in the
litigation and submit a report.8
When a foreign citizen is a litigant in a U.S. court, a domestic
party's attempt to conduct discovery in the foreign country com-
monly conflicts with foreign procedure. Many foreign courts per-
ceive U.S. discovery methods as an infringement on the foreign
I FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
S PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITI-
GATION 23 (1984).
4 J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DIS-
COVERY LAW, WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 8-11 (1982).
5 See Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 646, 647 (1967); Note, Taking Evidence Outside of the United States, 55 B.U.L.
REV. 368 (1975).
6 See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 9-23; Edwards, supra note 5, at 646-
47.
7 C. PR. CIv. arts. 252-280. This procedure is an enqute. See also INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE 130-49 (H. Smit ed. 1965) (compilation and compari-
son of procedures for all European jurisdictions).
8 This report, a descente sur les lieux, is prepared by thejuge dinstruction. C. PR. CIV. arts.
295-301.
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country's judicial sovereignty. 9 In response to this perceived intru-
sion, many nations have entered into treaties with the United States
to limit U.S. discovery,1 0 or even made compliance with American
discovery a criminal offense under "blocking statutes" or "anti-dis-
closure laws." I These efforts have not eased the international con-
flict; by most accounts, the political tension is increasing.' 2
In In re Socite Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale,13 the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals addressed issues involving both a discovery
treaty and a blocking statute. Two corporations, owned by the Re-
public of France, were defendants in a products liability suit. The
corporations advertised and sold airplanes in the United States. Ac-
tions for damages were instituted by plaintiffs following an accident
involving one of defendants' aircraft. 14 The plaintiffs sought discov-
ery, and the defendant French corporations moved for a protective
order. The French corporations argued that, as the materials sought
by discovery were located in France, the plaintiffs must conduct dis-
9 See Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585, 585-87 (1981); Onkelinx, Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction: Order-
ing the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 487 (1969);
Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 806-07 (1969) [hereinafter Hague Confer-
ence Report].
10 See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1982) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See also Convention on the Service
Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, done No-
vember 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 103.
11 See Law No. 80-538, Law Relating to the Communications of Economic, Commer-
cial, Industrial, Financial or Technological Documents or Information to Foreign Natural
or Legal Persons, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285, amending Law No. 68-678, 1968 J.O.
7267, 1968 B.L.D. 438 [hereinafter French Blocking Statute]. For English translations of
the French Blocking Statute, see Current Development, The 1980 French Law on Documents
and Information, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 382 (1981), and Toms, supra note 9, at 597.
See, e.g.s, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, Public General Acts, 1980, Pt. II,
ch. 11, at 243 (U.K.); Evidence Amendment Act, [1980] 1 N.Z. Stat. 34; Protection of
Business Act, 1978, No. 99, amended by Act of 1979, No. 114 (S. Afr.); Foreign Proceedings
(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts 1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts
1743; Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644 (1976);
Business Records Protection Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 56, sect. 2(1) (1980); Law of May 24,
1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGB 2] 835 (W. Ger.).
12 See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised)
§ 437 (Tent. Draft No. 7, April 10, 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (Revised)]. "No as-
pect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontiers of the
United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents associated
with investigation and litigation in the United States." Id., Reporters' Note 1, at 35. See
also Robinson, Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW. 533
(1984) (attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
stating that extraterritorial discovery issues have been among the most important concerns
of the State Department in recent years).
13 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aeros-
patiale v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
14 782 F.2d at 122. The actions were consolidated in the district court for the South-
ern District of Iowa. By agreement, the district court referred the actions to a magistrate
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
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covery in accordance with the Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention),' 5 to
which the United States and France are signatories. The French cor-
porations also argued that they should not have to comply with dis-
covery because to do so would subject them to criminal liability
under a French blocking statute.' 6 The district court denied defend-
ants' motion for a protective order and ordered compliance with dis-
covery.' 7 The French corporations petitioned the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus,' 8 seeking to overturn the
discovery order.
The court of appeals, noting that mandamus review is generally
available only under extraordinary circumstances, found this an ap-
propriate situation for such review due to "the novel and important
questions" concerning the interplay between the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Hague Convention, and the French blocking
statute. 19 Rejecting the French corporations' arguments regarding
the Hague Convention, the court held that the Convention does not
set exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and
information located in a signatory's jurisdiction. 20 The court also re-
jected an argument that the Hague Convention requires "first re-
sort" under its provisions, then subsequently to the Federal Rules as
a last resort if the discovery attempts are unsuccessful. 2 1 The court
ruled that "when the district court has jurisdiction over a foreign liti-
gant the Hague Convention does not apply to the production of evi-
dence in that litigant's possession, even though the documents and
information sought may physically be located within the territory of a
foreign signatory to the Convention."'22
15 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
16 French Blocking Statute, supra note 11, art. 3. The relevant provisions of the
French blocking statute forbid "all persons to ask, research or communicate, by writing,
orally or under any other form, documents or information on economical, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical matters leading to establishing proofs for use directly or
indirectly in foreign judicial or administrative proceedings." Art. l-bis (translation in In re
Socie'ti Nationale, 782 F.2d at 126). For a translation of the complete statute, see Toms,
supra note 9, at 597, or Current Development, supra note 9, at 382-83. Article 3 of the
statute requires imprisonment for two to six months and a fine of 10,000 to 120,000 francs
(approximately $1,750 to $21,000 U.S. dollars as of December 31, 1986) for conviction
under the statute.
17 In re Sociiti Nationale, 782 F.2d at 123.
18 "Mandamus has traditionally issued in response to abuses ofjudicial power. Thus,
where a... judge refuses to take some action he is required to take or takes some action he
is not empowered to take, mandamus will lie." BLACK's LAw DICIONAaV 866 (5th ed.
1979), citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953). "[I]t is clear
that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will jus-
tify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95
(1967).
19 In re Sociiti Nationale, 782 F.2d at 123.
20 Id. at 124.
21 Id. at 125.
22 Id. at 124.
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In reaching its decision on the inapplicability of the Hague Con-
vention, the court relied heavily upon a Fifth Circuit decision, In re
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH.23 In that case, the court required a West Ger-
man third-party defendant in a personal injury suit to comply with
discovery, despite the defendant's argument that the Hague Conven-
tion controlled extraterritorial discovery. The Fifth Circuit held that
"[t]he Hague Convention has no application at all to the production
of evidence in this country by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a
district court pursuant to the Federal Rules."' 24 The In re Socidti Na-
tionale court accepted the Fifth Circuit's statement that the Hague
Convention has "no application at all" when the parties are subject
to a U.S. court's jurisdiction. 25
The court acknowledged the dilemma in which the French
blocking statute26 placed the French corporations; they faced crimi-
nal liability in France if they complied with discovery, and sanctions
in the U.S. district court if they did not.27 However, the court stated
that "[t]he fact that foreign law may subject a person to criminal
sanctions in the foreign country if he produces certain information
does not automatically bar a domestic court from compelling pro-
duction."' 28 The court held that the competing national interests at
stake must be balanced to determine if the French defendant should
be compelled to produce the requested materials. 29 The court uti-
lized a balancing test derived from section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.30 The
court did not explain its analysis of this balancing test, but merely
stated that the magistrate properly employed the test and properly
ordered compliance with discovery.31
The court of appeals addressed separately the issue whether the
district court could impose sanctions on the defendants if the French
blocking statute prevented them from complying with the discovery
order. The court held that "the foreign party's good faith in at-
tempting to comply with the order is relevant to what sanctions, if
23 754 F.2d 602 (1985), cert. granted sub nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1986).
24 Id. at 615.
25 782 F.2d at 124.
26 See supra note 11.
27 782 F.2d at 126.
28 Id. (quoting United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345 (7th
Cir. 1983)).
29 782 F.2d at 126.
30 Id. at 126-27. Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) lists factors for the court to
consider such as (a) vital national interests of each state, (b) hardship upon the foreign
party, (c) the extent the discovery would take place in the foreign state, (d) the nationality
of the party. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965). See also infra note 115 for the complete text of section 40.
31 782 F.2d at 127.
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any, should be imposed." '3 2 Although the record did not reveal if the
corporations had attempted to secure a waiver of prosecution from
the French government, or some other means of making compliance
possible, the court noted that because the corporations are owned by
the French government, they stand in "a most advantageous posi-
tion" to receive permission to comply with the U.S. court order.33
Consequently the court denied the writ of mandamus, upheld
the discovery order and permitted the district court to impose sanc-
tions if the French corporations did not comply. The severity of the
sanctions was to turn upon the "good faith" of the corporations in
attempting to seek permission of the French government to release
the information.3 4 The court concluded that the discovery order did
not threaten French judicial sovereignty, as it only required the
French corporations to bring documents and information from
France, and did not require any participation by French judicial offi-
cials. 3 5 The court stated that it would be "the greatest insult to a
civil law country's sovereignty" to invoke the foreign country's judi-
cial aid subject to eventual override by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 36
To avoid such international insults, in 1970 the United States
and sixteen other nations3 7 entered into a multilateral Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 3 8
commonly called the Hague Convention. The Convention's stated
purpose is "to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or com-
mercial matters"3 9 between the signatory nations. Most foreign na-
tions participated in the Convention because of their displeasure
with the intrusion of U.S. discovery procedure into their borders.40
In contrast, the United States participated primarily because of the
frustration American lawyers had experienced in obtaining evidence
32 Id. (citing Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-06 (1958)).
33 782 F.2d at 127.
34 Id.
35 782 F.2d at 124-25 (citing In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d
729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Missis-
sippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 1633, order granting cert. vacated, 106 S. Ct. 2887 (1986),
discussed infra note 82).
36 782 F.2d at 125-26 (quoting Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 613).
37 The signatory nations are Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden,-the United Kingdom and the United States. Hague
Convention, supra note 10.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 (N.D. II. 1984). See also Hague Confer-
ence Report, supra note 9, at 806-08; Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 652 (1969).
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in the other countries. 4' While U.S. discovery practices arouse the
hostility of foreign countries, the evidence obtained by extraterrito-
rial discovery requests is often not in a form admissible, in a U.S.
court.4 2 The Hague Convention, therefore, was designed to make
discovery "tolerable" to the signatory nations, and permit the gath-
ering of evidence "utilizable" in a U.S. court. 43
The Hague Convention establishes three procedures for ob-
taining evidence abroad: through consular officials, 44 court-ap-
pointed commissioners, 45 or letters of request from the forum court
to a court in the foreign nation. 46 The Convention establishes lan-
guage requirements, 47 methods of submission to the foreign court,48
and allows a country "to declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purposes of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries."'49 The procedures
established by the Hague Convention, with the required court or
consular participation, are more formal and time consuming than the
discovery permitted by the Federal Rules. 50
The primary controversy that has developed in U.S. courts is
whether the Hague Convention preempts the Federal Rules regard-
ing extraterritorial discovery within the boundaries of nations that
have ratified the Convention. Three discernible patterns have
emerged in federal and state court analysis of the conflict. Although
some state courts, 51 and numerous commentators, 52 have argued
41 Borel & Boyd, Opportunities and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Liti-
gation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 35, 37 (1983).
42 Id. at 37.
43 Hague Conference Report, supra note 9, at 806.
44 A diplomatic officer or consular agent of the forum nation may take evidence
within the boundaries of another nation with prior permission. No compulsory process is
available. Hague Convention, supra note 10, at Chapter II, arts. 15-16, 21.
45 A court-appointed commissioner may take evidence in a foreign nation only with
permission of authorities in which the evidence is to be taken. No compulsory process is
available. Hague Convention, supra note 10, at Chapter II, arts. 17, 21.
46 A letter of request, or letter rogatory, is transmitted through the court in which the
suit is being heard to a "central authority" in the foreign nation. Compulsory process may
be available depending upon the law of the foreign nation. Hague Convention, supra note
10, at Chapter I, arts. 1-14.
These three procedures are also provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
47 Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.
48 Id. arts. 2-14.
49 Id. art. 23. France has declared that it will not execute letters of request for the
purposes of common-law discovery. All signatory nations have made similar declarations,
except Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States. For the text of
the declarations, see Hague Convention, supra note 10.
50 See Note, supra note 5, at 368 (comparing the procedures of the Hague Convention
and the Federal Rules). For an exhaustive comparison of the procedures of the Hague
Convention and the Federal Rules, see Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance
Under the Federal Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example: In re Westinghouse
Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 101 (1980).
51 Pierburg, GmbH v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876
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that the Hague Convention is the exclusive means of discovering evi-
dence abroad, apparently no federal court has accepted this argu-
ment. Some federal courts have taken the position that, as a matter
of international comity, 53 first resort should be made to the Hague
Convention procedures, then to the Federal Rules if efforts at dis-
covery are unsuccessful. 54 The majority of federal courts, however,
have concluded that the Convention does not preempt the Federal
Rules, and a litigant has the option to seek discovery under either set
of procedures. 55
State courts have been the strongest advocates of the position
that the Hague Convention is the exclusive means for obtaining evi-
dence abroad. 56 A Connecticut Superior Court stated that the
Hague Convention "represents the sole avenue open to an American
party wishing to obtain evidence in one of the contracting states."'57
Similarly, in Pierburg, GmbH v. Superior Court,58 a West German de-
fendant in a products liability suit sought protection from a Califor-
nia trial court's discovery order. The California Court of Appeals
(1982) (West German defendant in products liability suit); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Supe-
rior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981) (West German defendant in
products liability suit); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe, S.A., No. CV-80-00500083 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 22, 1982) (French defendant in patent infringement suit).
52 Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 231 (1986); Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention,
31 VILL. L. REV. 253, 257, 284-290 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery];
Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters:
The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1984)
[hereinafter Comment, Hague Convention].
53 Comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legis-
lative, executive or judicial acts of another nation." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164
(1894). See also R. CRANTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAws 1-8 (2d ed. 1975)
(discussion of international comity).
54 E.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
55 See, e.g.s, In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1986) (Hague
Evidence Convention has no application to discovery from parties in federal court litiga-
tion); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S.
Ct. 1633, order granting cert. vacated, 106 S. Ct. 2887 (1986) (Hague Evidence Convention
has no application to discovery from parties in federal court litigation); Compagnie Fran-
caise D'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (parties have option to proceed under either Hague Convention or Fed-
eral Rules); Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (parties
have option to proceed under either Hague Convention or Federal Rules); Graco v. Krem-
lin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Il. 1984) (Hague Evidence Convention merely supple-
ments the Federal Rules); Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (Hague Evidence Convention merely supplements the Federal Rules). See also,
Note, Extraterritorial Discovery---Hague Evidence Convention-The Hague Evidence Convention Pro-
cedures are not Exclusive, and Courts may issue Discovery Orders Using Alternative Means, 25 VA. J.
INTL L. 249 (1984). But see Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery, supra note 52, at 256 (first
resort position is perhaps most prevalent in federal courts).
56 See supra note 51.
57 Cuisinarts, slip op. at 5 (patent infringement suit).
58 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
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overturned the discovery order and ruled that the plaintiff must com-
ply with procedural requirements of the Hague Convention, rather
than California discovery procedure. Both the Connecticut and the
California courts based their decisions on the supremacy clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 59 These state courts acknowledged that the
federal government's ratification of an international treaty pre-
empted the state's authority.60
The federal courts that have concluded that first resort should
be made to the Hague Convention have based their rulings on no-
tions of international comity and judicial restraint from interfering in
international politics. 6 ' On the other hand, the courts that have con-
cluded that the Convention does not preempt the Federal Rules have
focused on the harm that American litigants would incur if forced to
resort solely to the Convention for discovery. 62 The concern of
these courts is that foreign litigants not have the opportunity to
shield crucial documents from discovery merely by storing them
abroad. One U.S. district court expressed its fear that if a party
could so easily evade discovery, U.S. businesses would open foreign
offices for the sole purpose of storing sensitive documents. 63
The Hague Convention contains some ambiguous language re-
garding the relationship of the Convention and the signatory na-
tions' individual domestic procedures. Article 27 states that "[ft]he
provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting
State from- . . . (b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act
provided for in this Convention to be performed upon less restric-
tive conditions; (c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods
of taking evidence other than those provided for in this Conven-
tion." 64 Many commentators have argued that this language allows a
contracting state to offer less restrictive judicial assistance than that
59 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
60 Cuisinarts, slip op. at 5; Pierburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
61 E.g.s, Shroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 83-C-1928 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
1983); General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83-C-0838 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1984);
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The
Philadelphia Gear court stated that "to permit one sovereign to foist its legal procedures
upon another whose internal rules are dissimilar would run afoul of the interest of sound
international relations and comity.... [T]he proper exercise ofjudicial restraint requires
that the avenue of first resort ... be the Hague Convention." 100 F.R.D. at 60-61.
62 See, e.g., Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 606.
This interpretation of the treaty [that the Hague Convention is exclusive],
taken to its logical conclusion, would give foreign litigants an extraordinary
advantage in United States courts. Insofar as [the foreign party] seeks discov-
ery, it would be permitted the full range of free discovery provided by the
Federal Rules. But when a United States adversary sought discovery, this
discovery would be limited to the cumbersome procedures and narrow range
authorized by the Convention.
Id. See also Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521-22.
63 E.g., Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
64 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
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required by the Convention. 6 5 Most federal courts, however, have
interpreted this language as permitting a contracting state to use the
Convention procedures or not at its discretion.6 6
Federal district and circuit courts have stated that foreign parties
subject themselves to the in personam jurisdiction of U.S. courts by
conducting business in America, and they are subject to discovery
under the Federal Rules as is any U.S. litigant. 6 7 In Anschuetz, the
Fifth Circuit unequivocally stated that the Hague Convention "has
no application at all to the production of evidence in this country by
a party subject to the jurisdiction of a district court pursuant to the
Federal Rules."' 68 The court grounded its holding on a position that
the discovery actually takes place in the United States, the situs of the
litigation, not in the foreign cofintry, the situs of the information. 69
An increasing majority of federal courts have held that the Hague
Convention procedures do not control discovery in federal courts,
even though the information sought is within the boundaries of a
signatory nation. 70
Although the federal courts are establishing a predictable posi-
tion on the relationship between the Hague Convention and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, much confusion still exists. An
examination of recent decisions of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania illustrates this confusion. In Lasky v.
Continental Products Corp. ,71 a West German defendant in a products
liability suit sought an order requiring the plaintiff to use the Hague
Convention procedures for discovery of documents located in West
Germany. The court denied the German defendant's request on the
grounds that the Hague Convention preserved the less restrictive
procedures of the Federal Rules, 72 and that requiring Hague Con-
vention procedures would severely restrict the scope of the U.S.
plaintiff's discovery. 7 3 The Lasky court's opinion in effect gives a liti-
gant the option to use either the Hague Convention or the Federal
Rules.
65 Id.
66 Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520-21; Lasky, 569 F. Supp. at 1228-29. See also Compagnie
Francaise D'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. 16 (1984) (article 27 is "inconsis-
tent with an interpretation of the Hague Convention that makes it the exclusive means of
gathering evidence abroad"). Id. at 27.
67 See, e.g.s, Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615 (5th Cir.); Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 521 (N.D. Ill.).
68 754 F.2d at 615.
69 Id. at 615. See also Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731. "[Tjhe Convention does not
apply to discovery sought here because the proceedings are in a United States court, in-
volve only parties subject to that court's jurisdiction, and ultimately concern only matters
that are to occur in the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 731.
70 See Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. at 26-28 (tracing the movement of federal courts to
this position).
71 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
72 Id. at 1228-29.
73 Id. at 1229.
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By contrast, in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp. ,74
which also involved a West German defendant in a products liability
suit, the court stated that the Hague Convention was "the avenue of
first resort" 75 and required the U.S. plaintiff to conduct discovery
under the Hague Convention procedures. Although the court ac-
knowledged that the plaintiff might be able to proceed under the
Federal Rules if the Convention procedures proved futile, the court
required the plaintiff to proceed first according to the Hague
Convention. 7 6
Subsequent cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have
become increasingly confused. In McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper
Co.,77 yet another West German defendant sought a protective order
in a products liability suit. The German defendant relied upon Phila-
delphia Gear; the plaintiffs relied upon Lasky. The court drew a dis-
tinction between one set of interrogatories requesting general
information about the defendant's business, which the court re-
quired the defendant to answer, and another set of interrogatories
requesting the identity and qualification of the defendant's expert
witnesses, which the court did not require the defendant to answer. 78
The court held that the second set of interrogatories and a request
for document production were "substantially equivalent to produc-
ing evidence" in West Germany, and that the Hague Convention
therefore controlled. 79
The confusion in the opinions of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania represents similar uncertainty in
other federal courts.80 In 1984, two appeals from state court deci-
sions presented to the U.S. Supreme Court the issue whether the
Hague Convention supercedes the Federal Rules. 81 The Court,
however, declined to decide the cases on their merits. The Court has
granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Anschuetz. 8 2 Additionally, the Court has granted a peti-
74 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
75 Id. at 61.
76 Id. at 60-61.
77 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
78 Id. at 958-59.
79 Id. at 959.
80 See Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery, supra note 52, at 269-72 (discussing the con-
tradictions presented by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania opinions and the confusion in
other federal courts).
81 Club Meditteranee, S.A. v. Dorin, 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984) (denying certiorari and
dismissing appeal from a 1983 New York decision); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Falzon, 465
U.S. 1014 (1984) (denying certiorari and dismissing appeal from a 1983 Michigan
decision).
82 754 F.2d 602, cert. granted sub noma. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1986). The Court had also granted a writ of certiorari to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Messerschmitt, but subsequently vacated the order
granting the petition. 757 F.2d 729 (1985), cert. granted sub nor. Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 1633, order granting cert. vacated,
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tion for writ of certiorari to review the Eighth Circuit's opinion in In
re Sociit6 Nationale.8 3
The Court will address nearly identical issues regarding the
Hague Convention in its review of Anschuetz and In re Sociit6 Nationale.
The Eighth Circuit, in deciding In re Socite Nationale, relied heavily
upon the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Anschuetz. In In re Sociiti Nationale,
the court of appeals held that the Hague Convention does not apply
when a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, even
though the documents and information sought under discovery are
located within the boundaries of a foreign signatory to the Conven-
tion.84 The court rejected the foreign litigant's contentions that the
Hague Convention should be the exclusive means for obtaining evi-
dence abroad, or alternatively that the Convention should be the first
resort.8 5 In doing so, the Eighth Circuit rejected the state court
opinions that acknowledged the exclusivity of the Hague Conven-
tion,8 6 and the federal court opinions that adopted the "first resort"
position.8 7
The Eighth Circuit in In re Sociite'Nationale also accepted the view
that " 'discovery does not "take place within [a state's] borders"
merely because documents to be produced somewhere else are lo-
cated there.' "88 The court adopted the theory that the discovery
actually takes place within the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, and does
not constitute discovery addressed by the Hague Convention.8 9 The
court concluded that the primary significance retained by the Hague
Convention is the establishment of procedures for discovery from
foreign non-parties not subject to a U.S. court's jurisdiction.90 Com-
mentators have argued that the foreign signatories did not have this
understanding of the Convention's purpose at the time of its
ratification. 9 1
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the contention that its decision
would undermine the purposes of the Hague Convention. The court
stated that the discovery order would aid in the flow of information,
which is the intent of the Convention. Further, the court concluded
106 U.S. 2887 (1986). The Court apparently vacated the order in Messerschmitt because
identical issues are raised in Anschuetz, and the Fifth Circuit relied completely upon the
Anschuetz opinion to decide Messerschmitt.
83 782 F.2d 120, cert. granted sub nom. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
84 Id. at 124.
85 Id.
86 See supra note 51.
87 See supra note 61.
88 782 F.2d at 124 (quoting Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611 (quoting Graco, 101 F.R.D. at
521)).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
91 See Heck, supra note 52, at 239-40, 251 (comparing German perception of the
Hague Convention with U.S. judicial interpretation).
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that its order would not affront France's judicial sovereignty. In con-
trast, the court reasoned that giving the Hague Convention first re-
sort would be "the greatest insult to a civil law country's
sovereignty" by invoking the country's judicial aid, subject to even-
tual override by the Federal Rules. 92
The Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Sociit6 Nationale grants the
greatest possible protection to U.S. litigants and gives little signifi-
cance to the Hague Evidence Convention. This position had already
been adopted by the Fifth Circuit 93 and various U.S. district courts, 94
and has since been adopted by the Ninth Circuit.95
In addition to entering cooperative treaties intended to control
U.S. discovery, many nations have enacted blocking statutes and
anti-disclosure laws to limit the intrusion of U.S. discovery into their
borders. 96 The majority of these statutes have been enacted since
1970, largely as a response to the increasing amount of international
antitrust litigation in U.S. courts.97 The United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, West Germany, and France, among other of the United
States' best trading partners, have enacted blocking statutes targeted
at U.S. discovery. 98
The French blocking statute99 involved in In re Sociite Nationale
was a direct response to perceived abuses in the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. antitrust laws.100 Paradoxically, blocking statutes
place foreign nationals, the class that the statutes are intended to
92 782 F.2d at 125-26.
93 See Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 604; Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 729.
94 See, e.gs, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
95 Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Alaska, 788 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (relying upon the Eighth Circuit's In re Sociite
Nationale opinion). The petitioning party in both the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit
cases is the same, as are the issues, but the cases arise from different products liability
suits.
96 See supra note 11 for a partial list of recently enacted foreign blocking statutes.
97 See Comment, Foreign Blocking Legislation: Recent Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement of
American Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 945; Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in
U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for
Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974).
More than any other single cause, the Westinghouse Uranium litigation, and the over-
whelming discovery requests involved, started the hostile foreign reaction to American
discovery and the recent enactment of the foreign blocking statutes. For a general account
of the facts leading to the Westinghouse Uranium litigation, see In re Westinghouse Uranium
Contract Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). The literature on the Westinghouse
litigation is voluminous. For a good treatment of the international litigation complexities,
see Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications, 14 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 59 (1979). See also, Merhige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case: Problems Encountered in Seek-
ing Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 Ir'L LAw. 19 (1979) (article written by US. district
court judge who tried first Westinghouse litigation, consolidated in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia).
98 Supra note I I lists the citations of the blocking statutes enacted in these countries.
99 See French Blocking Statute, supra note 16 for text of relevant portions of the stat-
ute. For legislative history and the debates on the statute, see [1980] J.O. 2231-2236.
100 Toms, supra note 9, at 585-86.
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protect, in an awkward legal position. The foreign party faces the
dilemma of either violating a criminal law of its home nation or vio-
lating a discovery order and receiving sanctions in a U.S. civil court.
Possible sanctions range from imprisonment for contempt to default
judgments to adverse findings of fact that could destroy the foreign
party's case.
The seminal case discussing the problem presented by blocking
statutes is Societi Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles, S.A. v.
Rogers.' 0 ' A Swiss holding company brought suit to recover one
hundred million dollars of assets seized by the United States under
the Trading with the Enemy Act. The U.S. government sought dis-
covery of documents maintained in Switzerland to investigate plain-
tiff's claims. The Swiss plaintiff opposed on the grounds that Swiss
penal law prohibited disclosure of banking records.' 0 2 Upon the
government's motion, the District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered the plaintiff to produce the records despite the Swiss prohi-
bition. The plaintiff gained the consent of the Swiss government to
produce much, but not all, of the relevant evidence. The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with discovery
completely, 10 3 and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the dismissal. 10 4
On a petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed
the dismissal, reasoning that the Swiss company had demonstrated a
"good faith attempt" to comply with discovery by seeking consent of
the Swiss government.' 0 5 The Court ordered the trial to proceed on
the merits, but acknowledged that in the absence of complete disclo-
sure by the plaintiff, the district court would be justified in making
findings of fact adverse to the plaintiff.10 6 Although the Court did
not permit dismissal, allowing the trial judge to make adverse find-
ings of fact could fatally injure the plaintiff's case.
Sociit Internationale is the Supreme Court's only decision directly
considering the conflict between a U.S. court's discovery order and a
foreign blocking statute. The decision is the primary statement of
the "good faith test" for blocking statute defenses.' 0 7 The test may
be stated as follows: When there are foreign legal barriers to the
production of documents, the party asserting the barrier must
101 357 U.S. 197 (1958). This is commonly referred to as the Interhandel litigation. See
Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 504-08.
102 357 U.S. 199-200.
103 Id. at 202. The district court dismissed the complaint as a Rule 37 sanction. FED.
R. Civ. P. 37.
104 243 F.2d 254 (1957).
105 357 U.S. at 208-13.
106 Id. at 212-13.
107 For a discussion of Sociiti Internationale's impact, see Comment, Extraterritorial Dis-
covery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320 (1983); Note, Strict Enforce-
ment of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 854-56 (1986).
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demonstrate a good faith effort to gain the consent of its sovereign
to produce the required records.' 08 Federal courts in subsequent
cases have consistently employed this test.'0 9 If a foreign party as-
serts its inability to comply due to legal barriers, the court will ex-
amine the party's "good faith" efforts to comply in considering what
sanctions to impose. 011
This "good faith" test, however, goes only to a determination of
what sanctions to impose on a noncomplying foreign party. Before
addressing the issue of appropriate sanctions, a court must deter-
mine whether it is proper to exercise jurisdiction to order discovery,
or for reasons of international comity, to defer to the foreign block-
ing statute. The Court in Socite Internationale determined that the
district court could properly order the foreign party to comply with
discovery. The Court placed particular emphasis on three factors:
the importance of the U.S. statute involved, the importance and rele-
vance of the documents requested, and the nationality of the party
asserting the blocking statute as a barrier. The Court reasoned that
the U.S. interest in preventing collusion with the enemy justified or-
dering discovery, and that the documents requested were vital to the
litigation."'I As the plaintiff was a Swiss national, it was in "a most
advantageous position" to obtain permission of the Swiss govern-
ment to release requested information." 12
Some federal courts have employed analysis nearly identical to
the Court's in Societi Internationale in deciding whether a U.S. court
should exercise its jurisdiction to compel discovery by a foreign
party."l 3 Since publication of the Restatement (Second) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States in 1965,' 14 most federal
courts have employed a balancing test contained within section 40115
108 See Onkelinx, supra note 9, at 507-08.
109 E.g.s, United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Graco v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. II. 1984); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
But cf. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson,
282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.
1959). In these three Second Circuit cases, the court deferred completely to foreign anti-
disclosure laws and "fundamental principles of international comity," Chase Manhattan
Bank, 297 F.2d at 613, and did not apply a balancing test. Other federal courts, and even-
tually the Second Circuit, rejected this approach. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1320;
Note, supra note 107, at 854-56.
110 See Comment, supra note 97, at 947-48.
111 357 U.S. at 204-06.
112 Id. at 205.
113 Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming
district court's refusal to order disclosure of a Swiss bank's customer lists); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (granting motion to compel discov-
ery of documents located in Canada).
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).
115 Section 40 of the Restatement provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
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to examine the interests of the nations involved and to determine
whether a foreign party should be ordered to comply with
discovery. 1 16
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. First National City
Bank of New York 117 was the first federal appellate court application
of the Restatement balancing test. First National City Bank (Ci-
tibank) refused to produce documents located in West Germany. A
grand jury investigating antitrust violations issued a subpoena duces te-
cum to obtain the documents." l8 Citibank claimed that compliance
with the subpoena would violate West German law and that its West
German customers might bring civil suits for disclosing their ac-
counts. The district court found Citibank in contempt, imposed a
fine of two thousand dollars per day until compliance, and sentenced
its vice-president to a jail term of sixty days if it did not comply ear-
lier. 119 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying most
heavily in its analysis on subsection (a) of the Restatement section
40. The court held that the "vital national interests" of the United
States in enforcing subpoenas outweighed the West German govern-
ment's interest in bank secrecy. 120
Other courts have similarly focused on the competing "vital na-
tional interests" criteria of subsection (a). In United States v. Vetco
Inc.,121 the court held that the U.S. interest in collecting taxes and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such
factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent en-
forcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40.
116 E.g.s, First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 345; Westinghouse Uranium Litigation, 563
F.2d at 992; United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288-91 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1098 (1981); Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phil-
lips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace,
102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
See Comment, supra note 107, at 1330; Note, supra note 107, at 857.
117 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
118 To underscore the procedural conflicts involved in international discovery, the
court noted that German law has no procedural device such as the subpoena duces tecum. A
person may be compelled to testify before a West German magistrate regarding the con-
tents of documents, but he is apparently not required to produce the documents them-
selves. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 900, n.7.
119 Id. at 900.
120 Id. at 900-02.
121 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (proceeding to enforce
subpoena issued by Internal Revenue Service and to obtain documents stored in
Switzerland).
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prosecuting tax fraud overcame Switzerland's interest in preserving
business secrets. In Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance pour le Commerce
Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ,122 the court concluded that the U.S.
interest in fully adjudicating disputes and protecting its own nation-
als from unfair advantage when sued in a U.S. court "dwarfed" the
French government's reasons for enacting a blocking statute.'l 3
Section 103 of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Revised)
lists additional factors for courts to consider in determining whether
it should exercise its enforcement jurisdiction. 124 More significantly,
the Tentative Draft of the revised Restatement adds a section specifi-
cally addressed to the conflict of U.S. discovery and foreign blocking
statutes. 125 Section 437 attempts to codify the holdings of SociitiIn-
122 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (French plaintiff seeking to avoid American defend-
ant's requested discovery of documents located in France).
123 Id. at 30.
124 RESTATEMENT (Revised), supra note 12, § 403.
125 Id. § 437 provides in full:
Discovery and Foreign Government Compulsion: Law of the United States
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (1)(c), a court or agency in the United
States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, may order a person
subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other infor-
mation relevant to an action or investigation, even if the information or
the person in possession of the information is outside the United States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information
may subject the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions,
including finding of contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or
default judgment, or may lead to a determination that the facts to
which the order was addressed are as asserted by the opposing
party.
(c) In issuing an order directing production of information lo-
cated abroad, a court or agency in the United States should take into
account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the doc-
uments or other information requested; the degree of specificity of
the request; whether the information originated in the United
States; the availability of alternative means of securing the informa-
tion; and the extent to which non-compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States, or com-
pliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
state where the information is located.
(2) (a) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is
prohibited by law, regulation or order of a court or other authority of
the state in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of
the state of which the prospective witness is a national,
(b) the person to whom the order is directed may be required
by the court or agency to make a good faith effort to secure permis-
sion from the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(c) sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or default should not or-
dinarily be imposed on the party that has failed to comply with the
order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or
removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort in
accordance with paragraph (a);
(d) the court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make find-
ings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the
order for production, even if that party has made a good faith effort
to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the infor-
mation available and that effort has been unsuccessful.
(This section was numbered § 420 in TENT. DRAFr No. 3, March 15, 1982).
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ternationale and subsequent lower federal court decisions. The sec-
tion provides that a U.S. court "may order a person subject to its
jurisdiction" to comply with discovery requests. 126 This directive fol-
lows the conclusion by some federal courts that "[a]s long as a fed-
eral court has personal jurisdiction over the party in possession or
control of the material sought, the court can order production."' 12 7
Section 437 also recognizes that a court may impose sanctions of
contempt, dismissal of claims or defenses, or default judgment upon
a noncomplying party, despite any blocking statute barrier.' 28 If a
party, however, has made a good faith effort to secure permission
from the foreign authorities to release the information, sanctions of
contempt, dismissal or default should not be imposed.1 2 9 The court
may still make findings of fact adverse to a noncomplying party, de-
spite evidence of good faith efforts to comply, 130 which could fatally
injure the noncomplying party's case.
In In re SocitiNationale the Eighth Circuit reiterated the standard
position of federal courts since the Supreme Court's decision in So-
cieti Internationale. The Eighth Circuit did not recognize the French
blocking statute as a bar to production of information located abroad
and required the foreign litigant to choose one horn of the dilemma
presented by the blocking statue. Either the French defendant must
violate a criminal statute of its home country, or it must violate a
discovery order in a U.S. court and face sanctions in its civil suit. In
effect, the court demanded that a foreign party doing business within
the United States submit to U.S. civil procedure.
The Eighth Circuit also employed the established analysis of
federal courts in examining blocking statute defenses. First, the
Eighth Circuit determined whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction to
order compliance with discovery.1 31 Then the court analyzed
whether the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction to com-
pel discovery. In doing so, the court of appeals utilized the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law section 40 test used by
other circuits1 32 to balance the competing national interests. The In
re Sociiti Nationale court, as have most federal courts that have em-
ployed the section 40 analysis, concluded that the U.S. interest in full
disclosure outweighed the foreign state's interest in business se-
crecy. The In re SocidteNationale decision reinforces what has become
accepted by the U.S. federal judiciary-a foreign party doing busi-
ness within the United States will have to comply with U.S. civil dis-
126 Id. § 437(1)(a).
127 First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 900-01.
128 RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, § 437(1)(b).
129 Id. §§ 437(2)(a), (b).
130 Id. § 437(2)(c).
31 782 F.2d at 126-27.
132 See supra notes 114 to 124 and accompanying text.
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covery procedures, despite criminal statutes forbidding disclosure in
the foreign party's home nation.
The Eighth Circuit applied the Sociiit Internationale "good faith"
test to determine what sanctions, if any, to impose.' 3 3 The court did
not examine the French defendant's good faith attempts to comply
with the district court's discovery order, as the defendant petitioned
the court of appeals to review the propriety of the order itself. The
court of appeals ruled that the foreign defendant's attempts at com-
pliance would only be relevant if it did not fully comply. The district
court would then have wide discretion to impose any sanctions it
deemed appropriate.134 In In re Sociiti Nationale, the court reiterated
established federal analysis, which is so firmly established that sec-
tion 437 of the Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States explicitly recognizes it.135
With its decision in In re Sociiti Nationale, the Eighth Circuit fol-
lows precedent established in other federal courts. First, the Eighth
Circuit joins other courts of appeals holding that the Hague Conven-
tion neither sets the exclusive and mandatory procedures for discov-
ering evidence abroad, 136 nor is the treaty to be considered a first
resort for discovery, with final recourse to the Federal Rules.' 37 Sec-
ond, the Eighth Circuit reaffirms that foreign blocking statutes do
not constitute an automatic bar to discovery. Rather, a federal court
will weigh the competing national interests. The Eighth Circuit, like
most other federal circuits employing such a test, finds the balance in
favor of the U.S. litigant. 138 In effect, if a federal court establishes
jurisdiction over a foreign party, the court will almost certainly order
discovery. In re Socilte Nationale, though a predictable decision, em-
phasizes the increasing conflict between U.S. discovery procedures
and international relations. Not only is the foreign litigant a citizen
of a foreign government, it is owned by a foreign government.
Foreign nations' suspicion and hostility toward U.S. discovery,
and their enactment of blocking statutes, is understandable. U.S. cit-
izens themselves caustically criticize the frequent abuse of U.S. dis-
covery procedure.' 39 But foreign nationals doing business in the
United States, with sufficient "minimum contacts" to establish U.S.
jurisdiction, 40 should be expected to submit to U.S. discovery. If a
133 782 F.2d at 127.
134 Id.
135 See supra notes 125 to 130 and accompanying text.
136 782 F.2d at 123-25; see supra notes 62 to 70 and accompanying text.
137 782 F.2d at 123-25.
138 Id. at 126-27.
139 Burger, Abuses of Discovery: Judges are Correcting the Problem, 20 TRIAL, No. 9, Sept.
1984, at 18. "Probably no single criticism of the judicial process ... has prompted more
discussion in recent years than complaints about abuse of discovery." Id. at 19 (statement
of Warren Burger, former ChiefJustice, U.S. Supreme Court).
140 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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foreign party avails itself of the advantages of the U.S. market, it
should be willing to submit to U.S. civil litigation procedures. U.S.
courts should strictly enforce international discovery orders, despite
foreign blocking laws, as long as the requested party has control over
the information. Sanctions should be imposed upon noncomplying
foreign parties who assert a blocking statute objection to discovery.
Additionally, the position of the noncomplying foreign party should
be considered in determining what sanctions to impose. If the for-
eign party is the plaintiff, compliance with U.S. discovery and pro-
duction of information maintained in its foreign locations should be
expected. Courts should, however, guard against a U.S. plaintiff us-
ing a foreign blocking statute against a foreign defendant as an of-
fensive strategy to effect default judgments or adverse findings.
Sanctions should be limited to adverse findings of fact if the foreign
party demonstrates a good faith attempt to comply, particularly if the
foreign party is a defendant.141
Actions of foreign governments to enact blocking statutes cause
the greatest harm to their own citizens. 142 If a foreign party is un-
able to comply with discovery, it faces default judgment, dismissal, or
other sanctions. Furthermore, foreign nationals may be at the mercy
of their American business counterparts, who could commit fraud
knowing that the foreign citizen would not be able to prove its case
with documents stored abroad. Foreign blocking statutes intended
to prevent U.S. discovery only aggravate the international conflict to
the detriment of the foreign citizen.
The Hague Evidence Convention presents entirely different is-
sues on international discovery. The Hague Convention is a multi-
lateral treaty regarding international discovery between the
signatory nations. As a signatory, the United States is bound by its
provisions. For the U.S. judiciary to declare that "Hague Conven-
tion does not apply to the production of evidence ... physically lo-
cated within the territory of a foreign signatory"' 143 emasculates the
Convention. International comity, rules of treaty interpretation, and
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers dictate that the
Hague Convention supercedes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in international discovery inside the signatory nations. 144 If a litigant
demands discovery under the Hague Convention, courts should rec-
ognize this demand to avoid trivializing the significance of this im-
portant multilateral treaty. However, as the Convention contains
141 Note, supra note 110, at 874-90 makes similar arguments and discusses necessary
exceptions and goals of strict enforcement.
142 See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 527.
143 In re Soeid Nationale, 782 F.2d at 124.
144 See Comment, Hague Convention, supra note 52 at 1485 (discussion of principles of
treaty interpretation that require use of Hague Convention's procedures over the Federal
Rules).
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language permitting an interpretation that the Convention proce-
dures are discretionary, 145 American courts will probably continue
to use familiar domestic discovery procedures.
The tension between American discovery and civil law discovery
may be irreconcilable. By deciding that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure override the Hague Evidence Convention, U.S. courts
have entered international politics. With their interpretation that the
Hague Convention does not apply to litigants subject to U.S. juris-
diction, U.S. courts have exacerbated the tension, as has the foreign
nations' enactment of blocking statutes.
DAVID JAMISON LAING
145 See supra notes 64 to 66 and accompanying text.
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